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Abstract 
 
Airlines wanting to cooperatively set prices for their international air travel service must apply to 
the relevant authorities for antitrust immunity (ATI).  While cooperation may yield benefits, it 
can also have anti-competitive effects in markets where partners competed prior to receiving 
ATI.  A carve-out policy forbids ATI partners from cooperating in markets policymakers believe 
will be most harmed by anti-competitive effects.  We examine carve-out policy applications to 
three ATI partner pairings, and find evidence more consistent with cooperative pricing in carve-
out markets in spite of the policy, calling into question the effectiveness of the policy in 
achieving intended market outcomes.  
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1. Introduction 
 Since the early 1990’s, there has been an increasing trend in cooperation among 
international carriers in the airline industry.  This is in part due to international restrictions that 
limit foreign carriers' service in domestic markets.  Cooperation can effectively allow carriers 
entry into foreign markets.  International carriers can establish a type of cooperation referred to 
as a codeshare agreement.  A codeshare agreement allows a carrier to operate a flight under the 
guise of a partner carrier.  Carriers in a codeshare agreement can sell tickets for flights on an 
itinerary in which a partner carrier operates at least one coupon segment on the itinerary.  The 
result is a passenger may fly with at least one carrier on the trip itinerary that is different from 
the carrier that sold the ticket for the entire trip to the passenger.  Additionally, international 
alliances allow for the carriers in the alliance to coordinate flight schedules (to decrease layover 
times), streamline luggage checking, share frequent flier programs and decrease gate proximity 
at airports, all of which improve travel conveniences for passengers.  There are three major 
international alliances: Skyteam, Star and Oneworld.  Carriers in each of these alliances may 
have codeshare agreements with other carriers within that alliance. 
 International carriers within an alliance may also apply to the antitrust enforcement 
authority of a country for antitrust immunity (ATI), which if granted would exempt certain 
cooperative actions between the carriers from being the basis of prosecution under the country's 
antitrust laws.  Codesharing and ATI differ in the extent of cooperation allowed.  Specifically, in 
addition to all of the cooperation associated with codesharing, if a carrier has ATI with another 
carrier then the ATI partners can cooperate with respect to setting fares.  In the U.S., it is the 
Department of Transportation (DOT) that is tasked with reviewing applications from airlines for 
ATI.  The DOT can deny the carriers ATI, grant the carriers ATI or grant the carriers ATI along 
with a carve-out.  A carve-out is a legal restriction that forbids collusive behavior between ATI 
partners in certain markets.1
 There has been an extensive amount of research regarding the market effects of varying 
forms of cooperation between carriers in international air travel markets; however, research 
regarding carve-outs is limited.  There has been no previous empirical research regarding the 
 
                                                          
1 In the European Union, the European Commission (EC) is tasked with granting carriers ATI.  Note that the DOT 
only has jurisdiction over international itineraries originating in the United States.  For a more thorough discussion 
of the process and rulings regarding ATI and carve-outs, see Bilotkach and Huschelrath (2011 and 2012).   
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market effects of policymakers imposing carve-outs, which is the primary contribution of this 
study.   
 A discussion of carve-outs requires a discussion of ATI.  There have been numerous 
theoretical and empirical studies examining the implications of ATI.  The results of these studies 
suggest the consequences of ATI vary by interline markets versus interhub markets.  Interline 
markets are markets in which a passenger must switch operating carriers at some point on their 
journey.  Interhub markets are markets between the carriers’ hubs in which a passenger is not 
required to transfer across operating carriers to complete their journey.  The key distinction 
between these two types of markets is that the partner carriers' transportation services are 
complementary in interline markets, but substitutable in the interhub markets.   
 Brueckner’s (2001) theoretical analysis suggests that ATI will lead to lower prices in 
interline markets, a prediction that is also consistent with theoretical analysis in Choi (2008).  
This is the result of elimination of double marginalization in the interline markets.  However, in 
interhub markets cooperation will have an anticompetitive effect (raise fares).  Brueckner (2001) 
notes the cooperation by the carriers may induce some cost efficiencies in all markets (interline 
as well as interhub) due to the impact of economies of passenger-traffic density.  Economies of 
passenger-traffic density is the phrase given to the situation in which an airline is able to lower 
the marginal cost of transporting a given passenger on a route the larger the volume of 
passengers it transports through the route [see Brueckner and Spiller (1994) and Gresik and 
Mansley (2001)].  These cost efficiencies have a countervailing effect to the anticompetitive 
effect in interhub markets.  Thus, if cost efficiencies in interhub markets are sufficiently large, 
prices may fall in these markets.  Numerous empirical studies including Brueckner and Whalen 
(2000), Brueckner et. al (2011) and Whalen (2007) conclude codesharing and ATI each serve to 
lower fares in interline markets; although, ATI has the greater effect on prices.  This supports the 
hypothesis that ATI eliminates double marginalization.2
 Although there are numerous studies examining the effects of ATI, the literature 
regarding carve-outs is limited.  Brueckner and Proost (2010) use a formal theoretical model to 
better understand when a carve-out can be beneficial or harmful to consumers.  The theory 
suggests that ATI has an anticompetitive effect in interhub markets serving to put an upward 
 
                                                          
2 Numerous additional studies relating cooperation in international markets to prices include, but are not limited to: 
Bilotkach (2005), Brueckner (2003a), Brueckner (2003b), Flores-Fillol and Moner-Colonques (2007), Gayle and 
Xie (2014), Hassin and Shy (2004) and Park and Zhang (2000). 
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pressure on prices for passengers.  However, in the presence of economies of passenger-traffic 
density, ATI may bring cost efficiencies to the carriers.  These cost efficiencies can be passed on 
to passengers in the form of lower prices.  Depending on which effect is greater, prices may rise 
or fall in the interhub markets.  Should potential economies of passenger-traffic density be 
pronounced, imposing a carve-out in principle limits cooperation, which in turn limits the ability 
to exploit economies of passenger-traffic densities potentially resulting in higher prices versus 
the alternative of no carve-out. 
 Brueckner and Picard (2012) explore the question of whether cooperation in interline 
markets increases the incentive to collude in interhub markets if a carve-out is present.  Although 
the carriers are forbidden from jointly setting prices in the interhub markets, there may be an 
incentive for tacit collusion.  For instance, one of the carriers raises the prices for their flights in 
the market and, likewise, the other carrier raises their prices without any prior discussion 
between the carriers.  Should this occur, this would pose a problem for regulators since the 
carve-out may not influence the outcome resulting from cooperative behavior of the ATI 
partners.  However, Brueckner and Picard’s (2012) theoretical analysis finds that there exists no 
incentive for tacit collusion. 
 The main purpose of this paper is to empirically investigate whether market outcomes are 
consistent with cooperative price-setting behavior among ATI partners in their carve-out 
markets.  In other words, do ATI partner carriers refrain from cooperatively setting prices in their 
carve-out markets as required by policymakers, or is there evidence of collusion in the carve-out 
markets?  Answering this question is tantamount to assessing the extent to which application of 
carve-out policy elicits the market behavior of carriers that policymakers intend.  The following 
is a brief description of the research methodology we use to investigate these issues.  
 We begin by specifying and estimating a discrete choice demand model of international 
air travel.  We then assume that multiproduct carriers set travel product prices according to a 
Nash equilibrium.  Conditional on the demand parameter estimates, the Nash equilibrium 
assumption allows us to compute markups and recover marginal costs of the products offered by 
the carriers.  The structural model affords us the opportunity to compute markups and recover 
marginal costs under two alternative scenarios: (1) where we assume the carriers that are given 
ATI cooperatively set their product prices in markets designated as carve-outs; and (2) where we 
assume the ATI partner carriers non-cooperatively set their product prices in their carve-out 
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markets, as required by a carve-out policy.  Based on Vuong (1989), we then employ a Vuong-
type non-nested likelihood ratio test to determine under which price-setting assumption the data 
provides a better goodness of fit.3
 The paper proceeds as follows.  In section 2 we provide discussion of examples in which 
the DOT granted carriers ATI with carve-outs.  In section 3 we discuss the data and define 
variables used in the analysis.  Section 4 discusses the econometric model used in the analysis.  
Section 5 discusses estimates from the model, Section 6 discusses empirical results regarding the 
outcomes of partner carriers' behavior in their carve-out markets, and Section 7 summarizes 
findings and offer concluding remarks. 
  In the combined subsamples of the American (AA)/LAN-
Chile (LA), Delta (DL)/Air France (AF) and United (UA)/Air Canada (AC) ATI pairings, the 
non-nested test result suggests that the model in which these partner carriers cooperatively set 
their product prices in their carve-out markets has better statistical support from systematic 
patterns in the data.   
 
2. Examples of ATI Decisions and Associated Carve-outs 
 Given the benefits that cooperation has been found to convey, ATI has been granted to 
numerous airline partnerships since the DOT’s first approval in 1993 of the partnership between 
Northwest and KLM.4
 The DOT’s first approval of ATI with a carve-out was in the case of United Airlines and 
Lufthansa in 1996.  The DOT imposed a carve-out in the Chicago-Frankfurt and Washington 
D.C.-Frankfurt markets.  United Airlines was also given ATI with Air Canada in 1997 where 
  However, theory suggests cooperation between partner carriers will result 
in anticompetitive effects in interhub markets, which harm passengers in these markets.  As a 
result, the DOT may impose a carve-out in the interhub market, which effectively forbids 
collusion between ATI partner carriers in markets the policymaker designate as carve-out.  The 
carve-out is meant to eliminate the anticompetitive effects.  However, in the case that ATI allows 
the partner carriers to achieve  cost efficiencies (even in interhub markets), an effective carve-out 
may negate some of these cost efficiencies.  The DOT must weigh these potential costs and 
benefits when deciding to impose a carve-out. 
                                                          
3 Gasmi, Laffont and Vuong (1992) similarly use non-nested likelihood ratio tests to examine cooperative behavior 
of Coca-Cola and Pepsi in the soft drink market.  For a more complete survey of applications of this type of 
statistical test, see Kadiyali, Sudhir and Rao (2001). 
4 There were no carve-outs given in this first ATI ruling by the DOT. 
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carve-outs in two markets were imposed.  Similarly, United Airlines was given ATI with Air 
New Zealand in 2001 where carve-outs in two markets were imposed.  United Airlines is 
currently involved in five separate ATI agreements where three are subject to carve-outs.5
 American Airlines was first given ATI with Canadian Airlines in 1996 with carve-outs in 
the New York-Toronto market; although, this particular ATI agreement ceased in 2007.  As of 
this writing, American Airlines has three separate ATI agreements: one with LAN and LAN-
Peru (two carve-outs), one with British Airways, Iberia, Finnair and Royal Jordanian (no carve-
outs) as well as one with Japan Airlines (no carve-outs). 
 
 In 1996 the DOT granted ATI to Delta and three foreign carriers (Austrian Airlines, 
Sabena and Swissair).  There were numerous carve-outs in this ruling by the DOT.  Additionally, 
in 2002 there was another ATI ruling regarding Delta that included three different foreign 
carriers: Air France, Alitalia and Czech Airlines (this was expanded later in 2002 to include a 
fourth foreign carrier, Korean Air Lines).  With this ruling, two carve-outs were implemented.  
The carve-outs were in the Atlanta-Paris and Cincinnati-Paris markets.  In the case of the latter 
ATI decision regarding Delta, the ATI partnership was expanded to include Northwest in 2008.  
However, in this expansion, the previously implemented carve-outs were removed.  The 
rationale posited is that a joint-venture among Delta, Northwest, Air France and KLM would 
allow the carriers to exploit potential cost efficiencies and provide an overall benefit to 
passengers.  Additionally, it is believed that granting the carriers ATI would not significantly 
lessen competition in those markets.6
 
 
3. Data, Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 
3.1 Data and Sample Selection 
 The data used in the study are from the International Passenger Origin and Destination 
Survey obtained from the U.S. Department of Transportation.  The survey is taken quarterly and 
contains a 10% sample of itineraries for international air travel where at least one segment on the 
itinerary is operated by a U.S. carrier.  Within the dataset, each observation contains information 
regarding the price of the itinerary, origin airport, destination airport, intermediate airport stops, 
number of passengers that purchased the particular itinerary, flight distance between each 
                                                          
5 For a complete history of ATI decisions and associated carve-outs, see Table A1 in the appendix. 
6 See U.S. Department of Transportation Office of the Secretary, Final Order 2008-5-32, May 22, 2008. 
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intermediate stop, ticketing carrier(s) for each coupon segment and operating carrier(s) for each 
coupon segment.  The data used in the study span from the first quarter of 2005 through the 
fourth quarter of 2010. 
 Our sample is restricted to itineraries that meet the following criteria.  First, we keep only 
itineraries that are roundtrip.  Itineraries that involve multiple ticketing carriers are also 
eliminated.  Additionally, itineraries that include the origin or destination as an intermediate stop 
or where the destination is another U.S. location are dropped.  Itineraries where an intermediate 
stop airport appears multiple times on the going (outbound) or coming (inbound) portion of the 
itinerary are also discarded.  Finally, we eliminate itineraries with a price less than $100 or 
greater than $10,000. 
 We define a market as an origin airport and destination airport combination at a particular 
time period.  For instance, travel from ORD (O’Hare International Airport in Chicago, U.S.) to 
FRA (Frankfurt Airport in Frankfurt, Germany) is a separate market than ORD to CDG (Charles 
de Gaulle Airport in Paris, France).  Likewise, travel from ORD to FRA in the first quarter of 
2005 is a separate market than ORD to FRA in the second quarter of 2005.  A product offered 
within a market is defined by the unique combination of ticketing carrier, group of operating 
carriers, and sequence of airports on the travel itinerary.   
 The number of itineraries in the dataset are very large and in many cases repeated 
multiple times.  Thus, to further simplify our analysis we collapse the itineraries in each market 
based on defined products.  We obtain the price of a product by the mean price for which the 
product was purchased, and the quantity sold, q, as the number of passengers that purchased the 
itinerary.  All prices are converted to 2005 dollars using the consumer price index.  In our final 
sample, there are a total of 1,791,108 observations/products and 475,639 different markets. 
 Consistent with the objective of our analysis, our sample data focus on markets in which 
ATI partner carriers each sell differentiated substitute products to consumers, i.e., consumers 
have the option to purchase substitutable products from each ATI partner carrier in a given 
market. 7
                                                          
7 A key point to note is that the data sample we use pertains to markets where the ATI partners are selling (ticketing 
carriers) products, not always necessarily where the ATI partners operate flights. 
  In addition, a subset of these markets are designated as carve-out for the partner 
carriers.  In the dataset, there are three such instances in which carriers with ATI each offered 
products in carve-out markets as well as other markets.  This is the case with the UA/AC, DL/AF 
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and AA/LA ATI partner pairings.  For instance, UA and AC are subject to carve-outs in the 
Chicago/Toronto and San Francisco/Toronto markets.  UA and AC each offered products in 
these two carve-out markets.  It is also the case that UA and AC each offered products in other 
markets including, but not limited to the following: Denver/Toronto and Newark/Vancouver.  As 
a result, we focus our attention to the three aforementioned ATI partner pairings and their 
respective carve-outs.  Table 1 illustrates the defined carve-out markets in our sample that we 
analyze. 
 
Table 1. Carve-Out Markets in the Data Sample that we Analyze* 
Carriers Carve-out markets Sample date begin (Q/YR) Sample date end (Q/YR) 
United/Air Canada Chicago-Toronto 1/2005 4/2010 
  San Francisco-Toronto 1/2005 4/2010 
Delta/Air France Atlanta-Paris 1/2005 2/2008 
  Cincinnati-Paris 1/2005 2/2008 
American/LAN-Chile Miami-Santiago 1/2005 4/2010 
*Note the carve-outs markets are defined using the respective carrier's hub in the city. 
 
 
3.2 Variable Definitions 
 Codesharing is defined as a situation in which the carrier that sells the travel ticket to the 
passenger (the ticketing carrier), differs from the carrier that owns the plane that transports the 
passenger (the operating carrier).  The first step in creating a codeshare variable is to account for 
regional carriers in the sample.  We make the assumption that the regional carriers operate for a 
major carrier.  For example, consider the case of the domestic regional carrier SkyWest Airlines 
(OO).  In our sample the assumption is made that SkyWest Airlines is operating local routes 
within the US for the major US ticketing carrier, where the major US ticketing carrier often 
transports passengers internationally using its own planes.  Therefore, in the sample the ticketing 
carrier/operating carrier, UA/OO, would be converted to UA/UA and not classified as 
codesharing between these carriers.  As such, following much of the literature on airline 
codesharing, our study only considers codesharing between major carriers.    
  There are two main types of codesharing: (1) Traditional; and (2) Virtual.  We 
distinguish between these two types of codesharing based on whether or not passengers are 
required to transfer from one operating carrier to another on the relevant portion of the itinerary 
being labeled as codeshare.  Specifically, on virtual codeshare portions of the itinerary 
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passengers are not required to transfer from one operating carrier to another, while transfer 
across operating carriers is required on traditional codeshare portions of the itinerary.  
Effectively, traditional codesharing requires complementary operating services between partner 
carriers, while virtual codesharing does not.  We further distinguish between two types of 
traditional codesharing: (i) Traditional 1; and (ii) Traditional 2.  Traditional 1 requires that the 
ticketing carrier also provides operating services on at least one segment of the traditional 
codeshare portion of the itinerary, while for Traditional 2 the ticketing carrier does not provide 
any operating services on the traditional codeshare portion of the itinerary.  Note that Traditional 
2 necessarily involves at least three partner carriers, where one carrier is solely the ticketing 
carrier and the others are operating carriers.           
 We construct variables that correspond to the three types of codesharing described above.  
One type of codeshare variable is defined as Trad_1_going.  Trad_1_going is a zero-one dummy 
variable that takes a value of one only if at least one coupon segment on the going portion of the 
product is operated by the ticketing carrier, and the remaining coupon segment(s) on the going 
portion of the product is(are) operated by a partner carrier.  Likewise, Trad_1_coming, accounts 
for this type of codesharing on the coming portion of the product.  Trad_2_going 
(Trad_2_coming) is a zero-one dummy variable that takes a value of one only if the ticketing 
carrier is not an operating carrier on the going (coming) portion of the product, and there are 
multiple partner operating carriers on this going(coming) portion of the product.  With each of 
these 2 types of traditional codeshare products, passengers are switching operating carriers at 
some point along their journey between the origin and destination.  Virtual_going 
(Virtual_coming) is a zero-one dummy variable that takes a value of one only if the ticketing 
carrier is different than the operating carrier, and all coupon segments on the going (coming) 
portion are operated by the same carrier.  Last, certain portions of a given itinerary may not 
involve any codesharing and are classified as online.  Online_going (Online_coming) is a zero-
one dummy variable that takes a value of one only if the ticketing carrier is the operating carrier 
for all coupon segments on the going (coming) portion of the product. 
 Other variables used in the analysis include, Opres, a measure of the size of each airline's 
presence at the origin airport of each market in the data.  Variable Opres takes a value equal to 
the number of distinct destination airports to which a carrier offers non-stop service leaving from 
the relevant origin airport for which variable Opres is being used to measure the size of the 
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airline's presence.  In contrast, variable MC_opres takes on a value equal to the number of 
distinct airports from which a carrier offers non-stop service going to the relevant origin airport 
for which MC_opres is being used to measure the size of the airline's presence.  Effectively, 
Opres is measured from the perspective of an airline's distinct "outbound" activities from an 
origin airport of a market, while MC_opres is measured from the perspective of an airline's 
"inbound" activities to the origin airport of a market.8
 The idea for two different presence variables is that Opres is more appropriate for partly 
explaining variations in demand across airlines, while MC_opres is more appropriate for partly 
explaining variations in marginal cost across airlines.  Opres is more appropriate for partly 
explaining variations in demand as consumers likely care about how many different destinations 
to which an airline flies non-stop from the passenger's origin airport.  MC_opres is more 
appropriate for explaining variations in marginal cost across airlines since a larger MC_opres 
value for an airline at an airport indicates that the airline can channel larger volumes of 
passengers through the airport, which may facilitate the airline being better able to exploit 
economies of passenger-traffic density.
  Given that the origin airport for each 
itinerary is located in the U.S., MC_opres is calculated using the Domestic Passenger Origin and 
Destination Survey.  This dataset is maintained by the U.S. Department of Transportation and is 
the domestic equivalent to the international dataset.   
9
 Nonstop_going (Nonstop_coming) is a zero-one dummy variable that takes a value of one 
only if the going (coming) portion of the product is a non-stop flight between the origin and 
destination.  Itinerary_dist_going (Itinerary_dist_coming) is a variable that measures the flying 
distance of the going (coming) portion of the product.  Route_qual_going (Route_qual_coming) 
is a measure of the routing quality of the going (coming) portion of the product.  It is defined as 
the minimum flying distance going to (coming from) the destination airport in the origin-
destination market as a percentage of the actual flying distance on the going (coming) portion of 
   
                                                          
8An airline’s inbound and outbound nonstop service activities at an airport need not be symmetrical in terms of the 
number and/or identity of endpoint cities from which its inbound flights come compared to the number and/or 
identity of endpoint cities to which it provides nonstop outbound service.  A reason for the potential asymmetry is 
that the plane used to provide inbound nonstop service to the relevant airport for a subset of passengers on the plane, 
may not contain nonstop passengers for the outbound service from the relevant airport to possibly a different city.  
As such, while variables Opres and MC_opres are likely positively correlated, they need not be perfectly correlated. 
9As described previously, economies of passenger-traffic density is the phrase given to the situation in which an 
airline is able to lower the marginal cost of transporting a given passenger on a route the larger the volume of 
passengers it transports through the route. 
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the itinerary for the product for which the routing quality is being measured.  If 
Route_qual_going (Route_qual_coming) takes on the maximum value of 100, then in terms of 
flying distance this is the most travel-convenient routing offered in the market for the going 
(coming) portion of the trip.10
 Close_comp_going (Close_comp_coming) is a variable that indicates the number of other 
products in the market with the same number of coupon segments on the going (coming) portion 
of the product, where these other competing products are not offered by the airline that offers the 
product for which the Close_comp_going (Close_comp_coming) measure is computed.  Finally, 
the observed product share, denoted by Sjmt, is the market share of product j in origin-destination 
pair, m, at time t.  Sjmt is calculated as the quantity sold of the product, qjmt, divided by the 
number of potential consumers for the market, POPmt, (measured by the population size of the 
origin city).
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  Table 2 shows summary statistics for the aforementioned variables. 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
(2005Q1 - 2010Q4) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Real_price1 979.28 901.90 89.55 9,992 
Quantity 5.62 39.12 1 5,812 
Sjmt 1.72e-3 0.01 1.18e-5 0.95 
Opres 26.48 40.56 0 265 
MC_opres 24.08 31.15 0 182 
Nonstop_going 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Nonstop_coming 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Itinerary_dist_going 3,949.23 2,485.02 96 17,801 
Itinerary_dist_coming 3,952.83 2,488.72 96 17,586 
Route_qual_going 94.07 9.28 35.71 100 
Route_qual_coming 94.00 9.36 28.28 100 
Close_comp_going 6.02 9.68 0 116 
Close_comp_coming 5.97 9.62 0 112 
Trad_1_going 0.16 0.36 0 1 
Trad_1_coming 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Trad_2_going 1.57e-3 0.04 0 1 
Trad_2_coming 2.09e-3 0.05 0 1 
Virtual_going 0.02 0.14 0 1 
Virtual_coming 0.02 0.15 0 1 
Observations 1,791,108 
   Markets 475,639 
   1. Fare for entire round-trip itinerary measured in constant year 2005 dollars 
                                                          
10 See Chen and Gayle (2014) for a detailed discussion of this distance-based measure of routing quality. 
11 Since product shares are extremely small values when using population size to measure potential market size, 
product shares are scaled up by a factor of 100. 
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4. Model 
4.1 Demand 
 A nested logit model is used to capture consumer’s choice behavior among differentiated 
air travel products sold in international air travel markets.  In each market we assume the number 
of potential consumers is equal to the population size in the originating city, POP.  Each 
consumer, denoted by c, can choose any one of J + 1 options, j = 0,1,…,J.  The outside 
option/good (j = 0) represents the consumer’s choice to not purchase any of the j = 1,…,J 
differentiated air travel products in the market, which effectively represents the consumer’s 
choice not to fly internationally.   
 The products within each market are organized into G + 1 mutually exclusive groups, g 
= 0,1,…,G.  The products within each group are closer substitutes than the substitutability of 
products across groups.  Groups are defined based on products offered by the same ticketing 
carrier.  
 Given this information, each consumers’ discrete choice optimization problem is to 
choose the alternative that yields them the highest utility: 
 
 max𝑗∈{0,1,…,𝐽𝑚𝑡}�𝑢𝑐𝑗𝑚𝑡  =  𝜇𝑗𝑚𝑡  +  𝛿𝜁𝑐𝑔𝑚𝑡  +  (1 − 𝛿)𝜀𝑐𝑗𝑚𝑡𝑑 �.   (1) 
 
The term 𝜇𝑗𝑚𝑡 represents the mean utility across all consumers that purchase product j.  Here, m 
indexes an origin airport and destination airport combination, and t indexes the time period.  
𝜁𝑐𝑔𝑚𝑡, is a random compenent of utility common to all products in group g.  𝜀𝑐𝑗𝑚𝑡𝑑  is a random 
component of utility specific to consumer c from consuming product j.  δ is a parameter that lies 
within the range of 0 to 1 and measures the consumer’s correlation of preference across products 
within the same group.  As δ approaches 1, consumers view products within the same group as 
closer substitutes.  The random components 𝜁𝑐𝑔𝑚𝑡  and 𝜀𝑐𝑗𝑚𝑡𝑑  have distributions such that 
𝛿𝜁𝑐𝑔𝑚𝑡  +  (1 − 𝛿)𝜀𝑐𝑗𝑚𝑡𝑑  has type 1 extreme value distribution.  
The mean utility, 𝜇𝑗𝑚𝑡, is specified as a linear function of product characteristics: 
 
 𝜇𝑗𝑚𝑡 =  𝑥𝑗𝑚𝑡𝜙𝑥 −  𝜙𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡 +  𝜉𝑗𝑚𝑡.       (2) 
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Thus, the mean utility from consuming product j is a function of the price of product j, 𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡,  a 
vector of observed non-price product characteristics, 𝑥𝑗𝑚𝑡, and an error term, 𝜉𝑗𝑚𝑡, representing 
the unobserved (by the researchers) product characteristics.  𝜙𝑥  and 𝜙𝑝are parameters to be 
estimated in the demand model. 
 The nested logit model yields the following predicted share function for product j: 
 
 𝑠𝑗(𝑝, 𝑥, 𝜉;𝜙𝑥 ,𝜙𝑝, 𝛿) =  exp� 𝜇𝑗(1− 𝛿)�𝐷𝑔  ×  𝐷𝑔1− 𝛿1+ ∑ 𝐷𝑔1− 𝛿𝐺𝑔=1 ,     (3) 
 
where 𝐷𝑔 =  𝛴𝑘∈𝐺𝑔exp [ 𝜇𝑘1− 𝛿], and the specification of 𝜇𝑗 is given in equation (2).  The subscript 
notations for market have been dropped only for convenience.  The demand for product j is given 
by the following:  
 
 𝑑𝑗 =  𝑠𝑗(𝑝, 𝑥, 𝜉;  𝜙𝑥,𝜙𝑝, 𝛿)  × 𝑃𝑂𝑃,       (4) 
 
where 𝜙𝑥, 𝜙𝑝 and δ are the parameters to be estimated in the demand model. 
 
4.2 Supply 
 To facilitate modeling supply of air travel products that involve codesharing, we assume 
that the ticketing carrier of the product markets and sets the final price for the round-trip ticket 
and compensates operating carrier(s) for operating services provided.  Unfortunately for 
researchers, partner airlines do not publicize details of how they compensate each other on their 
codeshare flights, so we face the challenge of specifying a modeling approach that captures our 
basic understanding of what is commonly known about how a codeshare agreement works 
without imposing too much structure on a contracting process about which we have few facts.  
The approach we use to model supply of products that involve codesharing is also used by Chen 
and Gayle (2007) and Gayle (2013).  
 A codeshare agreement can be thought of as a privately negotiated pricing contract 
between partners (𝑤, Γ), where 𝑤 is a per-passenger price the ticketing carrier pays over to an 
operating carrier for transporting the passenger, while Γ represents a potential lump-sum transfer 
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between partners that determines how the joint surplus is distributed.  For the purposes of this 
paper it is not necessary to econometrically identify an equilibrium value of Γ. 
 Let the final price of a product that involves codesharing be determined within a 
sequential price-setting game, where in the first stage of the sequential process an operating 
carrier sets price, 𝑤, for transporting a passenger using its own plane(s), and privately makes this 
price known to its partner ticketing carrier.  In the second stage, conditional on the agreed-upon 
price 𝑤 for services supplied by the operating carrier, the ticketing carrier sets the final round-
trip price 𝑝  for the product.  The final subgame in this sequential price-setting game is played 
between ticketing carriers, and produces the final ticket prices observed by consumers and us the 
researchers. 
 Let each ticketing carrier, denoted by f, offer to consumers a set of products, denoted by 
𝐹𝑓.  Thus, ticketing carrier f in market m sets final prices for these products according to the 
following optimization problem: 
 
  𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑝𝑗 ∀𝑗∈𝐹𝑓 �∑ (𝑝𝑗 −  𝑚𝑐𝑗)𝑞𝑗𝑗∈𝐹𝑓 �,       (5) 
 
where  �∑ (𝑝𝑗 −  𝑚𝑐𝑗)𝑞𝑗𝑗∈𝐹𝑓 � is variable profit carrier f obtains in the market by offering the set 
of products 𝐹𝑓 to consumers, 𝑝𝑗 is the price of product j, 𝑚𝑐𝑗 is the effective combined marginal 
cost ticketing carrier f incurs by offering product j and 𝑞𝑗 is the quantity sold of product j.   
 Let 𝑟 indexes operating carriers, and 𝑅𝑗 be the set of operating carriers that use their own 
planes to provide transportation services to product j.  The effective combined marginal cost of 
product j is given by 𝑚𝑐𝑗 = 𝑐𝑗𝑓 + ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑟𝑟∈𝑅𝑗  .  𝑐𝑗𝑓 is the part of the effective combined marginal 
cost that ticketing carrier 𝑓 incurs by using its own plane to provide transportation services on 
some segment(s) of the trip needed for product 𝑗 .  If ticketing carrier 𝑓  does not provide 
transportation service on any segment of the trip, then 𝑐𝑗
𝑓 = 0.   𝑤𝑗𝑟 is the price ticketing carrier 
𝑓  pays to operating carrier 𝑟  for its transportation service on the trip segment(s) that use(s) 
plane(s) owned by operating carrier 𝑟. 
 Since in equilibrium quantity of product j demanded is equal to quantity supplied, i.e. 
𝑑𝑗 = 𝑞𝑗, then we can replace 𝑞𝑗 in the optimization in (5) with the expression on the right-hand-
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side of the demand equation in (4). Therefore, across all carriers indexed by f in a given 
market, the optimization problem in (5) yields the following J first-order conditions: 
 
 ∑ (𝑝𝑘 −  𝑚𝑐𝑘) 𝜕𝑠𝑘𝜕𝑝𝑗 +  𝑠𝑗𝑘∈𝐹𝑓 = 0 for all j = 1,…,J    (6) 
 
where 𝐹𝑓 is the subset of products in the market that are offered to consumers by airline f.  The 
system of first-order conditions represented by equation (6) can be rewritten in matrix notation as 
the following: 
 
 𝑠 + (𝛺.∗ 𝛥) × (𝑝 −𝑚𝑐)   =  0,       (7) 
 
where p is a 𝐽 × 1 vector of product prices, mc is a 𝐽 × 1 vector of marginal costs, s is a 𝐽 × 1 
vector of predicted product shares, Ω is a 𝐽 × 𝐽 matrix of zeros and ones appropriately positioned 
to capture ticketing carriers' "ownership" structure of the J products in a market.  Δ is a  𝐽 × 𝐽 
matrix of first-order own-price and cross-price effects, where element ∆𝑗𝑘= 𝜕𝑠𝑘𝜕𝑝𝑗 .  Note, the 
operator .∗ represents element-by-element multiplication of two matrices.  
 A convenient feature of representing the first-order conditions using matrix notion is that 
the structure of matrix Ω in equation (7) effectively determines groups of products in a market 
that are jointly priced.  Specifically, element Ωjk equals to 1 only when products j and k are 
jointly priced, otherwise element Ωjk equals to 0.    The following is a simple example of what 
the Ω matrix looks like for a market with five products being offered for sale to consumers by 
three distinct ticketing carriers that do not cooperate in setting prices.  In this example, suppose 
product 1 is offered for sale to consumers by airline A, while airline B offers products 2 and 3, 
and airline C offers products 4 and 5, i.e., based on notation above products are grouped across 
airlines A, B and C respectively as follows: FA ={1}, FB ={2, 3} and FC ={4, 5}.  In this case, 
product 1 is priced separately from the other four products, products 2 and 3 are jointly priced, 
while products 4 and 5 are jointly priced, which yields the following Ω matrix: 
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















=Ω=Ω
−
11000
11000
00110
00110
00001
coopnon .    (8) 
 
Note that off-diagonal elements in Ω take the value 1 only when the two distinct products that 
correspond to the matrix row and column respectively are jointly priced.  For example, since 
products 2 and 3 are jointly priced, then off-diagonal elements in the second row and third 
column, and third row and second column are equal to 1.  Analogously, since products 4 and 5 
are jointly priced, then off-diagonal elements in the fourth row and fifth column, and fifth row 
and fourth column are equal to 1.     
  As can be seen from our simple example above, if the distinct ticketing carriers that offer 
products to consumers in a market non-cooperatively set their product prices, then the structure 
of Ω is simply determined by 𝐹𝑓 for all f in the market.  On the other hand, if subsets of these 
ticketing carriers are ATI partners and jointly/cooperatively set prices in a given market, then the 
structure of Ω is based on product-groupings according to subsets of ATI partners instead of 𝐹𝑓.  
For instance, in the example above if airline A and airline B became ATI partners, then products 
1, 2 and 3 will be jointly priced, and the new Ω, denoted Ωcoop, is as follows: 
 
    
















=Ω=Ω
11000
11000
00111
00111
00111
coop .    (9) 
  
In other words, Ωjk is set equal to one for all products in the market offered by each of the 
respective ATI partners.  We will subsequently exploit this convenient feature of matrix Ω to 
analyze price-setting behavior of ATI partner carriers in their carve-out markets.  
 Equation (7) can be used to calculate a 𝐽 × 1 vector of product markups as follows: 
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 𝑚𝑘𝑢𝑝(𝑝, 𝑥, 𝜉;  𝜙𝑥,𝜙𝑝, 𝛿) =  𝑝 −𝑚𝑐 = −(𝛺.∗ 𝛥)−1  × 𝑠.    (10) 
 
Furthermore, equation (7) can be re-arranged to yield the following supply equation: 
 
   𝑝 = 𝑚𝑐 + 𝑚𝑘𝑢𝑝(∙).       (11) 
 
4.2.1 Alternate Supply Equations 
 In our analysis we define Ω in two ways to denote two different scenarios that we 
consider.  In one scenario we construct Ω, denoted by ΩATI-cvout, assuming carriers that have been 
given ATI cooperate in all markets except markets in which the ATI is subject to a carve-out.  
Thus, in this scenario the structure of the supply-side of our model is built on the assumption that 
ATI partners non-cooperatively set prices for their products in their carve-out markets, but 
jointly/cooperatively set prices for their products in non-carve-out markets where they each offer 
products. Drawing on the explicit market example previously described with 5-products and 3-
airlines, if the market is designated as a carve-out, then ΩATI_cvout = Ωnon-coop from equation (8) for 
that market, but if the market is not designated as a carve-out, then ΩATI_cvout = Ωcoop from 
equation (9) for that market.  Effectively, ΩATI-cvout is constructed under the assumption that 
carve-outs work as policymakers intend.   
 In an alternate scenario we construct Ω, denoted by ΩATI, assuming the carriers that have 
been given ATI cooperate in setting prices in all markets that they each sell products.  In other 
words, irrespective of whether or not a given market is designated as a carve-out, under this 
alternate scenario the structure of the supply-side of our model is built on the assumption that 
ATI partners cooperatively set prices of their products in each market.  Again drawing on the 
explicit market example previously described with 5-products and 3-airlines, ΩATI = Ωcoop from 
equation (9).     
 The two alternate price-setting behavioral assumptions described above yield the 
following two alternate structural expressions for computing product markups:   
 
𝑚𝑘𝑢𝑝𝐴𝑇𝐼(𝑝, 𝑥, 𝜉;  𝜙𝑥,𝜙𝑝, 𝛿) = −(𝛺𝐴𝑇𝐼 .∗ 𝛥)−1  × 𝑠,     (12) 
 𝑚𝑘𝑢𝑝𝐴𝑇𝐼_𝑐𝑣𝑜𝑢𝑡(𝑝, 𝑥, 𝜉;  𝜙𝑥,𝜙𝑝, 𝛿) = −(𝛺𝐴𝑇𝐼_𝑐𝑣𝑜𝑢𝑡.∗ 𝛥)−1  × 𝑠.   (13) 
 
17 
 
Note that these expressions illustrate that product markups can be computed once we have in 
hand the demand parameter estimates, 𝜙𝑥� , 𝜙𝑝�  and 𝛿.  Equation (7), along with the two markup 
expressions in (12) and (13) imply the following two alternate structural supply equations:   
 
𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡 = 𝑚𝑐𝑗𝑚𝑡𝐴𝑇𝐼 + 𝑚𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡𝐴𝑇𝐼 ,      (14) 
  𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡 = 𝑚𝑐𝑗𝑚𝑡𝐴𝑇𝐼_𝑐𝑣𝑜𝑢𝑡 + 𝑚𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡𝐴𝑇𝐼_𝑐𝑣𝑜𝑢𝑡,      (15) 
 
where 𝑚𝑐𝑗𝑚𝑡𝐴𝑇𝐼  and 𝑚𝑐𝑗𝑚𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝐼_𝑐𝑣𝑜𝑢𝑡 are marginal cost functions only known up to parameters by us 
the researchers.  In particular, let the marginal cost functions be parametrically specified as: 
 
𝑚𝑐𝑗𝑚𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝐼 = 𝜃𝑊𝑗𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑚𝑡𝐴𝑇𝐼,       (16) 
𝑚𝑐𝑗𝑚𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝐼_𝑐𝑣𝑜𝑢𝑡 = 𝛾𝑊𝑗𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑚𝑡𝐴𝑇𝐼_𝑐𝑣𝑜𝑢𝑡,     (17) 
 
where 𝑊𝑗𝑚𝑡  is a vector of marginal cost shifting variables, while 𝜃  and 𝛾  are the associated 
vectors of parameters.  𝜀𝑗𝑚𝑡𝐴𝑇𝐼 and 𝜀𝑗𝑚𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝐼_𝑐𝑣𝑜𝑢𝑡 are components of marginal cost that are unobserved 
to us the researchers, which we assume to be random and each have a mean of zero. 
 Last, substituting equations (16) and (17) into (14) and (15) yields the following 
empirical specifications of the supply equations:  
  
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 ℎ:   𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡 = 𝜃𝑊𝑗𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑚𝑡𝐴𝑇𝐼 + 𝑚𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡𝐴𝑇𝐼 ,    (18) 
  𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝑔:   𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡 = 𝛾𝑊𝑗𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑚𝑡𝐴𝑇𝐼_𝑐𝑣𝑜𝑢𝑡 + 𝑚𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡𝐴𝑇𝐼_𝑐𝑣𝑜𝑢𝑡,   (19) 
 
where  𝜀𝑗𝑚𝑡𝐴𝑇𝐼 and 𝜀𝑗𝑚𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝐼_𝑐𝑣𝑜𝑢𝑡  are the structural error terms.  The key objective of the empirical 
analysis is to estimate these two alternate structural supply equations (Model h versus Model g), 
and evaluate which of the two has better statistical support from the data.  
 Our methodology is to first estimate the demand parameters, use these demand parameter 
estimates to compute product markups under each alternate pricing behavior (𝑚𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡𝐴𝑇𝐼   versus 
𝑚𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝐼_𝑐𝑣𝑜𝑢𝑡 ), then use these product markups as variables when estimating the alternate 
supply equations, Model h and Model g.  Finally, in the spirit of Villas-Boas (2007), Gayle 
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(2013), and Gayle and Brown (2014), we use non-nested statistical tests based on Vuong (1989) 
to see which supply specification best fits the data.  Note that the estimated markups (𝑚𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡𝐴𝑇𝐼   
versus 𝑚𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝐼_𝑐𝑣𝑜𝑢𝑡 ) are different under each alternate pricing behavior, as such, the 
competing estimated supply equations are not nested, which is why a non-nested statistical test is 
needed to evaluate which supply model best fits the data. 
 
5. Estimation and Results 
5.1 Demand Estimation 
 As shown in Berry (1994), the following linear equation specification can be used to 
estimate the parameters in the nested logit demand model: 
 
 ln�𝑆𝑗𝑚𝑡� − ln(𝑆0𝑚𝑡) = 𝑥𝑗𝑚𝑡𝜙𝑥 − 𝜙𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡 + δln�𝑆𝑗𝑚𝑡/𝑔� + 𝜉𝑗𝑚𝑡,   (20) 
 
where 𝑆𝑗𝑚𝑡 is the observed market share of the product, 𝑆0𝑚𝑡 is the observed market share of the 
outside good, and 𝑆𝑗𝑚𝑡/𝑔 is the observed within group share of the product.  The estimation of 
equation (20) needs to take into account the potential endogeneity of 𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡 and 𝑆𝑗𝑚𝑡/𝑔. 
 
5.1.2 Instruments  
 Valid instruments will be correlated with 𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡  and 𝑆𝑗𝑚𝑡/𝑔, but uncorrelated with 𝜉𝑗𝑚𝑡 .  
The instruments used in demand estimation are: (1) the number of other products in the market 
with an equivalent number of coupon segments on the going (coming) portion of the itinerary, 
where these other competing products are not offered by the airline that offers the product for 
which the instrument variable value is computed; (2) the total number of miles flown on the 
going (coming) portion of the itinerary; and (3) the deviation of a product’s itinerary flying 
distance-based routing quality measure from the mean routing quality measure across the set of 
products offered by the ticketing carrier.12
                                                          
12 For cases in which the routing quality is equal to the mean routing quality of all products offered by the carrier, 
the deviation of routing quality instrument variable is constructed to take the maximum value of the routing quality 
measure of 100. 
  (1) and (2) instrument for price, while (3) instruments 
for the within group share. 
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 The instruments for price stem from the fact that price, as shown in equation (11), is 
composed of a markup and marginal cost component.  Instrument (1) serves as a measure of the 
level of competition a product faces in the market; thus, affecting the product’s markup.  
Instrument (2) follows from the idea that flying distance is likely to be correlated with the 
product’s marginal cost.  Following arguments in Chen and Gayle (2014), the use of instrument 
(3) stems from the idea that, all else equal, consumers prefer the product with the most direct 
routing, i.e., highest routing quality measure, between the origin and destination.  Since the 
demand model groups products by airlines, which defines how within group product shares are 
computed, the rationale for the instrument is that the lower (greater) the product's routing quality 
relative to the mean routing quality across products offered by the airline in the market, then the 
lower (greater) will be the product's within group share.  Thus, the instrument is likely to be 
correlated with the product’s within group share. 
 The arguments made in the previous two paragraphs provide reasons to believe that our 
instruments are likely correlated with the endogenous variables.  However, it is also important 
that the instruments are unlikely to be correlated with the shocks to demand captured by 𝜉𝑗𝑚𝑡. 
For the latter property of our instruments we rely on the fact that the menu of products offered by 
airlines in a market is predetermined at the time of shocks to demand.  Furthermore, unlike price 
and within group product share, the menu of products offered and their associated non-price 
characteristics are not routinely and easily changed during a short period of time, which 
mitigates the influence of demand shocks on the menu of products offered and their non-price 
characteristics.  Therefore, a product's itinerary flying distance and its routing quality measure 
are predetermined during the short-run period of price-setting by airlines and product choice by 
passengers, which makes these valid non-price product characteristics to use for constructing 
instruments. 
 
5.2 Results from Demand Estimation 
 Table 3 reports ordinary least squares (OLS) and two-stage least squares (2SLS) methods 
of estimating coefficients in the demand model.  The coefficient estimates on 𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡  and ln (𝑆𝑗𝑚𝑡/𝑔) are consistent with economic theory, but are very different in magnitude across the 
two methods of estimation.  A Wu-Hausman test is performed to examine the endogeneity of 
𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡 and ln (𝑆𝑗𝑚𝑡/𝑔).  The Wu-Hausman test result is reported in the last row of Table 3 and 
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provides strong evidence of the endogeneity of 𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡 and ln (𝑆𝑗𝑚𝑡/𝑔).  Thus, instruments must be 
used.   
As a check on the statistical power of instruments to explain variations in the endogenous 
variables, we perform nested likelihood ratio tests.  Using OLS, each endogenous variable is first 
regressed against the exogenous variables, which serve as the restricted specifications in the 
nested likelihood ratio tests.  Second, for the unrestricted specifications in the nested likelihood 
ratio tests, each endogenous variable is regressed against the exogenous variables and the 
instruments.  The χ2 test statistics regarding the joint significance of the instruments in 
explaining variations in 𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡 and ln (𝑆𝑗𝑚𝑡/𝑔) are 7,777.92 and 477,883.53, respectively, where 
each is statistically significant at the 1% level.  Thus, the instruments do have power in 
explaining variations in the endogenous variables. 
 In light of the Wu-Hausman test results, we focus subsequent discussion on the 2SLS 
regression estimates.  Consistent with economic theory, the coefficient estimate on price is 
negative.  An increase in price lowers the utility of consumers, all else constant.  Additionally, 
note the statistical significance of coefficient estimate on ln (𝑆𝑗𝑚𝑡/𝑔) suggests that consumers 
have greater preference for the set of products offered by a given carrier.  This provides evidence 
that consumers exhibit some brand loyalty to a particular carrier. 
 The coefficient estimate on Opres is positive.  Therefore, all else constant, the more 
destinations a particular carrier offers service to leaving from the consumer's origin airport, the 
more likely it is that the consumer will choose to fly with that carrier.  This is consistent with the 
idea that consumers have a preference for a particular carrier.  Consumers within a market will 
want to reap the rewards of any frequent-flier programs offered by a particular carrier.  Thus, the 
more destinations the carrier offers services to, the consumer can use that particular carrier to 
travel and obtain the frequent-flier rewards.  This is consistent with the idea that consumers 
exhibit brand loyalty. 
 The coefficient estimates for Nonstop_going and Nonstop_coming are each positive.  All 
else constant, consumer utility is greater using nonstop products versus products that require 
intermediate stop(s).  As expected, the evidence suggests that, on average, passengers view 
intermediate stops as travel inconveniences.  The positive coefficient estimates on 
Route_qual_going and Route_qual_coming support this argument and go a step further to 
suggest that among products with equivalent number of intermediate stops, passengers prefer the 
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product with the most direct routing (higher measures of Route_qual_going and 
Route_qual_coming) between the origin and destination, all else constant. 
 Regarding the coefficient estimates on the codeshare variables, first consider 
Trad_1_going and Trad_1_coming.  These negative coefficient estimates imply that codeshare 
products, where the ticketing carrier operates at least one coupon segment, are less preferred to 
pure online products, all else constant.  Additionally, the coefficient estimates on Trad_2_going 
and Trad_2_coming are negative as well.  All else constant, a codeshare product for which the 
ticketing carrier is not an operating carrier, and the consumer is required to switch partner 
operating carriers at some point during their travel, lowers the utility of the consumer.  Switching 
carriers is an inconvenience for the consumer.  It is worth noting that the magnitude of the 
coefficient estimates for Trad_1_going and Trad_1_coming are smaller than that of 
Trad_2_going and Trad_2_coming, suggesting that products where the ticketing carrier operates 
on a portion of the itinerary are preferred to products where the ticketing carrier does not operate 
on a portion of the itinerary.  Since the consumer purchased the ticket from the ticketing carrier, 
this provides evidence that consumers have a preference for the carrier with which they interact 
when purchasing the travel ticket. 
 The coefficient estimates on Virtual_going and Virtual_coming are negative as well.  
Thus, all else constant, consumer utility is lower with virtual codeshare products versus pure 
online products.  The evidence therefore suggests that consumers view virtual codeshare 
products as inferior substitutes to pure online products.  It is worth noting that the magnitudes of 
coefficient estimates on the codeshare variables suggest that consumers least prefer virtual 
codeshare products.  This provides additional evidence that consumers have a preference for 
using products in which the carrier with which they interact when purchasing the travel ticket 
also provides operating service on at least one segment of the trip.  This may be particularly true 
for international air travel compared to domestic air travel since for international air travel the 
gap in consumers' familiarity between the ticketing carrier and partner operating carrier(s) may 
be wider due to the fact that the partner operating carrier(s) is (are) likely to be foreign carrier(s) 
that is (are) less frequently used by the consumer.  
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Table 3. Demand Estimation Results 
(2005Q1 - 2010Q4) 
  OLS 2SLS 
Variable Estimates Std. Error Estimates Std. Error 
Real_price -0.00002*** (5.22e-7) -0.00214*** (0.00003) 
ln(Sjmt/g) 0.40303*** (0.00061) 0.16484*** (0.00262) 
Opres 0.00501*** (0.00002) 0.00629*** (0.00008) 
Nonstop_going 0.80914*** (0.00434) 0.76043*** (0.00870) 
Nonstop_coming 0.80146*** (0.00443) 0.75636*** (0.00895) 
Route_qual_going 0.00786*** (0.00008) 0.00895*** (0.00018) 
Route_qual_coming 0.00730*** (0.00008) 0.00870*** (0.00018) 
Trad_1_going -0.25311*** (0.00180) -0.04971*** (0.00696) 
Trad_2_going -0.32409*** (0.01270) -0.18513*** (0.04399) 
Trad_1_coming -0.23605*** (0.00171) -0.03632*** (0.00683) 
Trad_2_coming -0.27768*** (0.01021) -0.08736*** (0.04105) 
Virtual_going -0.48041*** (0.00459) -0.44063*** (0.01190) 
Virtual_coming -0.47594*** (0.00417) -0.22349*** (0.01243) 
Constant -8.58837*** (0.19404) -6.51280*** (0.80244) 
Ticketing carrier FE Yes Yes 
Origin FE Yes Yes 
Destination FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Quarter FE Yes Yes 
Obs 1,791,108 1,791,108 
R2 0.7722 0.6978 
Wu-Hausman (χ2)   94,076.8 
*indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, **indicates statistical significance at the 5% level  
and ***indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. 
  
  
 To the best of our knowledge this paper is the first to formally investigate and provide 
evidence of consumers' preference over various types of international codeshare products.  
However, since this is not the main focus of this research, we leave more detailed investigations 
of such consumer preferences for future research.       
 The coefficient estimates of the demand model yield a mean own-price elasticity of -2.30.    
This estimate of the own-price elasticity is similar to what has been found in U.S. domestic air 
travel markets.  For instance, recent estimates of the own-price elasticity by Peters (2006) are in 
the -3.20 to -3.60 range, while Berry and Jia (2010) estimate own-price elasticities to be in the 
range of about -1.89 to -2.10. 
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5.3 Prices, Product Markups and Recovered Product Marginal Costs 
 With the demand parameter estimates in hand, we use these estimates along with the 
product markup expressions in equations (12) and (13) to compute product markup variables 
𝑚𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝐼   and 𝑚𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝐼_𝑐𝑣𝑜𝑢𝑡, respectively.  Table 4 reports summary statistics on these product 
markups and prices in carve-out markets. 
 The data in Table 4 reveal that in carve-out markets, on average, ATI partner carriers 
charge higher prices and have larger markups than other carriers.  As expected, ATI partner 
carriers' product markups generated by the model under the assumption of cooperative behavior 
between these carriers (𝑚𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡𝐴𝑇𝐼) are higher than markups generated by the model under the 
assumption of non-cooperative behavior between these partner carriers (𝑚𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝐼_𝑐𝑣𝑜𝑢𝑡).  Given 
that our demand model generates elasticity estimates similar to what other researchers have 
found, and given that standard static oligopoly theory suggests that markups are determined by 
demand elasticities, then the product markups generated by our model should also be consistent 
with markups that would be generated from other empirical studies on air travel demand.   
 Product level marginal costs can be recovered from the alternate supply models 
by simply subtracting product markups from price, i.e., 𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡 − 𝑚𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡𝐴𝑇𝐼   and 𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡 −
𝑚𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝐼_𝑐𝑣𝑜𝑢𝑡 yield product level marginal costs under the alternate supply models respectively.  
The summary statistics in Table 4 suggest that marginal costs of ATI partner carriers' products in 
their carve-out markets are, on average, higher than the marginal costs of products offered by 
other carriers in these markets.   
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Table 4 
Summary Statistics on Prices, Product Markups and Recovered Product Marginal Costs  
  AA/LA Carve-out Markets 
  
DL/AF Carve-out Markets  
 
UA/AC Carve-out 
Markets 
  AA/LA  
Products 
 
Other 
Carriers 
Products 
DL/AF 
Products  
 
Other 
Carriers 
Products 
UA/AC 
Products  
Other 
Carriers 
Products 
  Mean 
(Std. error) 
Mean 
(Std. error) 
Mean 
(Std. error) 
Mean 
(Std. error) 
Mean 
(Std. error) 
Mean 
(Std. error) 
Price ($)  1,569.71*** 
(68.55) 
 
758.30*** 
(124.40) 
 
1,486.66*** 
(56.76) 
 
845.98*** 
(36.35) 
 
723.19*** 
(28.04) 
 
586.16*** 
(21.83) 
 
 
 
Product 
Markups 
($) 
Assuming ATI Partners Non-
cooperatively Set Prices 
�𝑚𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝐼_𝑐𝑣𝑜𝑢𝑡� 
473.92*** 
(0.40) 
 
466.94*** 
(0.05) 
 
486.19*** 
(0.44) 
 
467.54*** 
(0.05) 
 
480.40*** 
(0.24) 
 
467.65*** 
(0.06) 
 
Assuming ATI Partners 
Cooperatively Set Prices 
�𝑚𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝐼�   
479.34*** 
(0.25) 
 
466.94*** 
(0.05) 
 
490.69*** 
(0.36) 
 
467.54*** 
(0.05) 
 
480.96*** 
(0.17) 
 
467.65*** 
(0.06) 
 
 
 
Recovered 
Marginal 
Cost ($) 
Assuming ATI Partners Non-
cooperatively Set Prices 
�𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡 − 𝑚𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝐼_𝑐𝑣𝑜𝑢𝑡� 
1,095.80*** 
(68.43) 
 
291.36** 
(124.39) 
 
1,000.48*** 
(56.86) 
 
378.44*** 
(36.35) 
 
242.78*** 
(28.03) 
 
118.51*** 
(21.82) 
 
Assuming ATI Partners 
Cooperatively Set Prices 
�𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡 − 𝑚𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝐼� 
1090.37*** 
(68.54) 
291.36** 
(124.39) 
 
995.97*** 
(56.80) 
 
378.44*** 
(36.35) 
 
242.22*** 
(28.04) 
 
118.51*** 
(21.82) 
 
Notes:  *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, and **indicates statistical significance at the 5% level. 
 
5.4 Results from Estimation of Alternate Supply Equations 
 As shown in the specification of the structural supply equations (18) and (19), 
coefficients on product markup variables 𝑚𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡𝐴𝑇𝐼   and 𝑚𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝐼_𝑐𝑣𝑜𝑢𝑡 are restricted to be equal 
to 1.  This coefficient restriction effectively implies that 𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡 − 𝑚𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡𝐴𝑇𝐼   and 𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡 −
𝑚𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝐼_𝑐𝑣𝑜𝑢𝑡 are the dependent variables in supply Model h and Model g respectively.  In fact, 
𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡 − 𝑚𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝐼   and 𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡 − 𝑚𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝐼_𝑐𝑣𝑜𝑢𝑡  are recovered marginal costs.  Therefore, the 
coefficients that are actually estimated in the supply equations are marginal cost function 
parameters associated with the marginal cost shifting variables in 𝑊𝑗𝑚𝑡 .  Since it is assumed that 
marginal cost shifting variables are exogenous, then we simply estimate supply Model h and 
Model g using ordinary least squares.   
 Recall that the key objective of estimating the alternate supply equations is to examine 
price-setting behavior of carriers in carve-out markets.  Given this objective, it is most 
appropriate to estimate the supply equations on data from the respective carriers’ carve-out 
markets.  The data sample used for estimating the supply equations consist of all products in 
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carve-out markets, not just products offered by ATI partner carriers.  Furthermore, in our data 
sample ATI partners each sell products in each of their carve-out markets.  Parameter estimates 
for supply Model h and Model g are reported in Table 5. 
  
Table 5.  Supply Equation Regressions Estimated using Data from 
AA/LA, DL/AF and UA/AC Carve-out Markets 
 
ATI Partners Cooperate  
in all markets: Model h  
ATI Partners do not Cooperate  
in carve-out markets: Model g 
 
 
Dependent Variable: 
𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡 − 𝑚𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝐼  
 
Dependent Variable: 
𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡 − 𝑚𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝐼_𝑐𝑣𝑜𝑢𝑡 
  Coefficient Estimate (Standard error) 
Coefficient Estimate 
(Standard error) 
Mc_opres 7.99*** 7.84*** 
  (2.42) (2.42) 
Mc_opres2 -0.05*** -0.05*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) 
Nonstop_going 457.82*** 461.73*** 
  (102.50) (102.52) 
Nonstop_coming 453.46*** 457.04*** 
  (83.98) (84.03) 
Itinerary_dist_going 0.22 0.22 
  (0.17) (0.17) 
Itinerary_dist_coming 0.19 0.19 
  (0.15) (0.15) 
Trad_1_going 253.99* 256.84* 
  (136.15) (136.18) 
Trad_1_coming 387.56*** 390.30*** 
  (115.18) (115.21) 
Virtual_going 120.04 121.43 
  (100.87) (100.93) 
Virtual_coming 145.98 147.09 
  (102.81) (102.86) 
Constant -2,176.26*** -2,167.95*** 
  (833.04) (833.17) 
Observations 1,408 1,408 
R2 0.2591 0.2607 
 *indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, **indicates statistical significance at the 5% level  
 and  ***indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.  Quarter, year,  operating carrier, origin and destination  
 fixed effects are included when estimating regressions. 
  
 First, the sign pattern of the coefficient estimates on the size of an airline's airport 
presence variables (Mc_opres and Mc_opres2) suggests that the size of an airline's airport 
presence has a positive marginal impact on the airline's marginal cost at relatively low levels of 
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its airport presence, but eventually has a negative marginal impact on the airline's marginal cost 
at relatively high levels of its airport presence.  These coefficient estimates can be interpreted as 
capturing the effect of an airline's “hub-size” on its marginal cost.  In other words, the sign 
pattern of these coefficient estimates suggests that an airline is not likely to achieve marginal 
cost efficiencies in a market until the airline reaches a certain scale of operation at an endpoint 
airport of the market.  Therefore, we believe the size of an airline's airport presence variables in 
the marginal cost function indirectly capture economies of passenger-traffic densities that 
airlines can achieve by channeling a relatively large volume of passengers through endpoint 
airports of the market. 13
 The coefficient estimates for Nonstop_going and Nonstop_coming are each positive, 
suggesting that, all else constant, an airline's marginal cost is higher for providing nonstop 
itineraries versus itineraries that require intermediate stop(s).  A rationale for intermediate stop(s) 
itineraries being associated with lower marginal cost compared to nonstop itineraries is that 
airlines often channel passengers from different origins, who have common destinations, through 
common intermediate stop hub airport(s).  This practice allows airlines to better fill individual 
flights, which can result in the airline incurring a lower cost per passenger to transport 
passengers, i.e., an airline can exploit economies of passenger-traffic density by using 
intermediate stop(s). 
 
Even though the coefficient estimates on the itinerary flying distance variables 
(Itinerary_dist_going and Itinerary_dist_coming) are not statistically significant at conventional 
levels of statistical significance, these coefficient estimates have the expected positive sign in the 
marginal cost function.  The coefficient estimates on these variables suggest that itinerary flying 
distance positively affect marginal cost, likely driven by the link between fuel usage and flying 
distance. 
                                                          
13 We also consider specifications of marginal cost that allow for a more explicit capture of economies of passenger-
traffic densities.  Specifically, such marginal cost equation specifications include as right-hand-side variables (linear 
and quadratic) the total number of passengers using an airline's products at the origin airport for these products.  The 
idea is that as the volume of passengers that an airline serves at an origin airport increases, economies of passenger-
traffic density effect should lower the marginal cost to the airline of providing products that have the airport as an 
origin.  In these marginal cost regression specifications, consistent with the eventual impacts of economies of 
passenger-traffic density, we obtain a positive coefficient estimate on the linear part of this right-hand-side variable, 
but a negative coefficient estimate on the quadratic part of this variable. We are happy to provide these regression 
results upon request. 
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The positive coefficient estimates on the traditional codeshare variables (Trad_1_going 
and Trad_1_coming) suggest that airlines' marginal cost of providing these codeshare itineraries 
is higher compared to providing pure online itineraries.14
 
  The relatively higher marginal cost 
associated with these codeshare itineraries may be related to inefficiencies associated with 
transferring passengers across the networks of partner carriers. Interestingly, the coefficient 
estimates on the virtual codeshare variables (Virtual_going and Virtual_coming) are statistically 
insignificant at conventional levels of statistical significance, suggesting that the marginal cost of 
providing virtual codeshare itineraries is statistically equal to the marginal cost of providing pure 
online itineraries.  As is the case for pure online itineraries, passengers are not required to travel 
across different carriers networks on virtual codeshare itineraries, which rules out inefficiencies 
associated with transferring passengers across the networks.  As such, the statistical equality of 
marginal costs associated with providing pure online and virtual codeshare itineraries is 
consistent with the rationale we posit for traditional codeshare itineraries having higher marginal 
cost compared to pure online itineraries.              
6. Results from Assessing Cooperative Behavior in Carve-out Markets  
 Up until this point we have not determine which of the two alternate structural supply 
equations best approximates strategic interaction between ATI partner carriers in their carve-out 
markets.  For this investigation we rely on a likelihood-based non-nested statistical test in Vuong (1989).  The Vuong (1989) non-nested statistical test is used to compare which of the two 
alternate non-nested supply model regressions shown in Table 5 has better statistical support 
from the data.  The test statistic, t, for the non-nested test is calculated as follows: 
 
 𝑡 = ∑ (𝐿𝐿𝑖𝐴𝑇𝐼�𝜃��−𝐿𝐿𝑖𝐴𝑇𝐼_𝑐𝑣𝑜𝑢𝑡(𝛾�))𝑛𝑖=1
�𝑛
1
2� �𝜔�
,       (21) 
 
where 𝜃�  and 𝛾�  are the parameter estimates from the two respective models;  𝐿𝐿𝑖𝐴𝑇𝐼(𝜃�)  and 
𝐿𝐿𝑖
𝐴𝑇𝐼_𝑐𝑣𝑜𝑢𝑡(𝛾�) are the log-likelihood function values for observation i from the two respective 
                                                          
14 Unlike in the full data sample used for estimating the demand model, the data subsample (carve-out markets) used 
for estimating the supply equations do not have products with traditional codeshare itineraries that are of the 
Trad_2_going and Trad_2_coming type.  The products with traditional codeshare itineraries in the data subsample 
used for estimating the supply equations are only of the Trad_1_going and Trad_1_coming type.    
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models; n is the number of observations; and 𝜔� is the standard error of the differences in the log-
likelihood function values. The test statistic is asymptotically normally distributed.  The null 
hypothesis is that the two models are statistically equivalent.  Given critical values, -c and c, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis when -c < t < c, but reject the null hypothesis if t > c or t < -c.  
In the case that t > c, then the data better support the model in which the respective ATI partners 
cooperate in all markets (Model h).  In the case that t < -c, then the data better support the model 
in which the ATI partners do not cooperate in carve-out markets (Model g). 
 For the two supply models in Table 5 the value of the non-nested test statistic, t, is 
2.8883.  Since this test statistic value is positive and greater than the 5% critical value of 1.64 for 
a one-tail test, then we conclude that at conventional levels of statistical significance, the data 
better statistically support the supply model that is estimated under the assumption that ATI 
partners cooperate in all markets (Model h).  In other words, in spite of policymakers forbidding 
cooperative behavior among ATI partners in carve-out markets, the evidence suggests that ATI 
partners, perhaps tacitly, manage to achieve cooperative outcomes in carve-out markets.   
 
7. Conclusion 
 The primary goal of this paper is to empirically determine the extent of ATI partners' 
cooperative behavior in their carve-out markets.  Upon first estimating a differentiated products 
demand model, then specifying a Nash price-setting game between airlines that offer these 
differentiated products, we are able to compute product markups and recover marginal costs.  
Furthermore, the structural model allows us to compute markups and recover marginal costs 
under two alternative scenarios: (1) where we assume the carriers that are given ATI 
cooperatively set their product prices in markets designated as carve-outs; and (2) where we 
assume the ATI partner carriers non-cooperatively set their product prices in their carve-out 
markets, as required by a carve-out policy.  We then perform a non-nested likelihood ratio test to 
identify which assumed price-setting behavior has better statistical support from systematic 
patterns in the data.  For the three ATI partner pairings we study - American (AA)/LAN-Chile 
(LA), Delta (DL)/Air France (AF) and United (UA)/Air Canada (AC) - the non-nested test result 
suggests that the model in which these partner carriers jointly/cooperatively set their product 
prices in markets designated as their carve-out markets has better statistical support from 
systematic patterns in the data.   
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 To the best of our knowledge this paper is the first to formally investigate and provide 
evidence of consumers' preference over various types of international codeshare products.  
Specifically, estimates from our demand model suggest that consumers least prefer virtual 
codeshare products.  This provides evidence that consumers have a preference for using products 
in which the carrier with which they interact when purchasing the travel ticket also provides 
operating service on at least one segment of the trip. 
 A well established literature that may have implications for the issues examined in this 
paper is the literature that posits the idea of mutual forbearance [Bernheim and Whinston (1990); 
Evans and Kessides (1994); Baum and Korn (1996); Gimeno (1999); Gimeno and Woo (1999); 
Bilotkach (2011); Zou, Yu and Dresner (2012); Ciliberto and Williams (2014)].  In the field of 
industrial organization the concept of mutual forbearance posits that a firm will be inclined not to 
compete aggressively in a given market for fear of retaliation in other markets where it competes 
with the same firms.  In other words, a firm may choose to be more cooperative with other firms 
in a market when it has substantial multimarket contact (MMC) with these firms.  Our empirical 
analysis shows evidence that, on average, ATI partner carriers jointly/cooperatively set their 
product prices in markets designated as their carve-out markets.  However, it is possible that the 
strength of this result depends on the extent of MMC between the ATI partner carriers that are 
servicing the given carve-out market.  We leave examining such possibilities for future research.        
 In summary, the key finding in this research, at a minimum, calls into question the 
effectiveness of carve-out policy in achieving intended market outcomes.  As such, this paper 
highlights the need for further research to better understand the efficacy of applying carve-out 
policy. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Chronological history of ATI by U.S. carrier 
U.S. Carriers ATI partners ATI approval ATI close-out Associated carve-outs 
Northwest KLM 1/1993    
  KLM and Alitalia* 12/1999 10/2001   
United Airlines Lufthansa 5/1996  Chicago-Frankfurt and 
Washington D.C.-Frankfurt 
  Lufthansa and SAS* 11/1996    
  Air Canada 9/1997  Chicago-Toronto and San 
Francisco-Toronto 
  Air New Zealand 4/2001  Los Angeles-Auckland and Los 
Angeles-Sydney 
  Austrian Airlines, 
Lufthansa and SAS* 
1/2001    
  Copa Airlines 5/2001    
  Asiana 5/2003    
  Austrian Airlines, 
Lufthansa, Air Canada, 
SAS, British Midland, 
LOT, Swiss International 
Air Lines and TAP*1 
2/2007    
  Austrian Airlines, 
Lufthansa, Air Canada, 
SAS, British Midland, 
LOT, Swiss International 
Air Lines, TAP and SN 
Brussels*1 
7/2009    
  ANA 11/2010     
*indicates an expansion of previous ATI decisions. 
1. British Midland did not operate in the alliance beyond 4/2012. 
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Table A1 Cont. Chronological history of ATI by U.S. carrier 
U.S. Carriers ATI partners ATI 
approval 
ATI close-
out 
Associated carve-outs 
Delta Austrian Airlines, Sabena 
and Swissair 
6/1996 5/20072 Atlanta-Zurich, Atlanta-
Brussels, Cincinnati-Zurich, 
New York-Brussels, New 
York-Vienna, New York-
Geneva and New York-Zurich 
  Air France, Alitalia, Czech 
Airlines 
1/2002  Atlanta-Paris and Cincinnati-
Paris 
  Korean Air Lines, Air 
France, Alitalia and Czech 
Airlines* 
6/2002    
  Virgin Blue Group 6/2011    
Delta and 
Northwest 
Air France, KLM, Alitalia, 
Czech Airlines* 
5/2008  Atlanta-Paris and Cincinnati-
Paris carve-outs removed 
American Airlines Canadian Airlines 7/1996 5/20073 New York-Toronto 
  LAN 9/1999  Miami-Santiago 
  Swissair 5/2000 11/2001 Chicago-Brussels 
  Sabena 5/2000 3/2002 Chicago-Zurich 
  Finnair 7/2002    
  Swiss International Air 
Lines 
11/2002 8/2005   
  SN Brussels 4/2004 10/2009   
  LAN and LAN-Peru* 10/2005  Miami-Lima 
  British Airways, Iberia, 
Finnair and Royal 
Jordanian* 
7/2010    
  Japan Airlines 11/2010     
*indicates an expansion of previous ATI decisions. 
2. Although not officially closed until 2007, this alliance was only active until 8/2000. 
3. Although not officially closed until 2007, this alliance was only active until 6/2000. 
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